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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.1 
I take as a point of departure Akhil Amar’s general description of the 
Sixth Amendment and his typology.2  He aptly describes the Sixth Amendment 
as the “heartland of constitutional criminal procedure.”3  In this symposium, we 
discussed the right of confrontation and aspects of the right to counsel.  Amar 
located those rights within the “fair trial cluster” of Sixth Amendment rights.4 
He linked the rights of confrontation and counsel together with compulsory 
process, and he characterized them as the “great engines by which an innocent 
man can make the truth of his innocence visible to the jury and the public.”5 
Amar’s final statement focused on the importance of these combined 
rights in the presentation of evidence at the showpiece of the criminal justice 
system—the contested criminal trial.6  Here, the defendant, aided by counsel, 
can demonstrate his innocence.7  I am attracted to the image of the full 
enjoyment of these rights coming together where the decision on guilt or 
innocence is made.  The simplest and the purest enjoyment of the right to 
counsel occurs in the adversarial trial with an experienced and adequately 
resourced defense attorney cross-examining prosecution witnesses and 
presenting the defendant’s case.8  I much prefer the idea of ensuring 
confrontation rights at trial by making avoidance difficult, which prompts the 
prosecution to find, prepare, and present the witnesses, rather than the “get out 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 641 (1996). 
 3. Id.  I take issue with many of Amar’s most basic conclusions, but not with the framework he sets. 
 4. Id. at 642.  Amar finds the amendment to have three clusters of rights:  the first concerns speedy 
trial, the second a public trial, and the third a fair trial.  Id. at 642-43.  The fair trial rights encompass  
notice and the opportunity to hear and be heard.  Put slightly differently, this last cluster 
safeguards the right to know, and defend oneself against, an accusation of criminal wrongdoing.  
Textually, this cluster encompasses the rights to (a) be informed of the nature and cause of 
accusation; (b) be confronted with prosecution witnesses; (c) compel the production of defense 
witnesses; and (d) enjoy the assistance of counsel in defending against the accusation.   
Id. at 642. 
 5. Id. at 643. 
 6. See id. at 705-10. 
 7. Id. at 708. 
 8. See id. at 706. 
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of jail free” result for the defendant when the confrontation right is violated and 
critical hearsay statements are excluded.9 
There are two major practical problems with Amar’s concept, however, 
and one conceptual one.10  The two practical problems go a long way toward 
destroying an idealized view of the Sixth Amendment rights that come together 
in the adversarial defense.11  In discussions about this Symposium, Andy 
Taslitz suggested to me that in his view, the adversarial defense is dead, dying, 
or at least badly injured.12  He somewhat overstated the point, but the larger 
trends in the criminal justice system give some reality to the trend he 
suggested.13 
What are the problems?  The first is with counsel.14  Clearly, that right is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as interpreted initially by Gideon v. 
Wainwright and expanded most recently by Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. 
Frye.15  As a practical matter largely driven by resource limitations, however, 
the right, in a sense of effective assistance, does not exist for many defendants, 
even those charged with serious criminal cases.16  The second is with the trial.17 
Again, the guarantee is theoretically clear, but we simply do not have many 
trials anymore.18  Scholars and commentators have noted this trend for a 
number of years, and now the Supreme Court in Lafler has made it official: 
“[T]he reality [is] that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials.”19 
The conceptual problem is with showing that a defendant is innocent 
through a criminal trial.  As we now conceive actual innocence—a conclusive 
showing that the defendant did not commit the crime—it will almost never be 
proven at trial.20  If clear innocence is established with scientific proof or 
something of similar certainty, such as digital trace evidence, that proof is 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC’Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 12 
(1988) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS] (stating that prosecutors have adjusted their practices as a 
result of the exclusionary rule). 
 10. See Amar, supra note 2, at 705-10. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See generally Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System: 
The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 948-49 (2008) (arguing 
that a lack of reform for indigent defense has led to a broken and unreliable criminal justice system). 
 13. See id. at 947-48. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
 16. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 16 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] 
(stating that lack of funding and resources is a major cause of the indigent counsel crisis). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at 41 (claiming that underfunding has led to 
negotiated dispositions supplanting trials, resulting in “‘bargain-basement’ justice”). 
 19. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1381. 
 20. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1669-70 (2008) 
(stating that current inconsistent criminal procedure rules hinder access to DNA evidence at trial, which is the 
most probative exculpatory evidence of innocence).  
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typically produced either before or after trial. 21  The best we get at trial is that 
the defendant may not have committed the crime—the acquittal occurring 
because there is some level of doubt.22  Given the high percentages of 
defendants who are guilty, we do not know whether an acquittal was a victory 
or a defeat for justice, which makes it difficult to celebrate as a triumph of both 
accuracy and procedural fairness.23  The uncertainty about innocence when the 
typical acquittal occurs leads to a secondary set of issues regarding the meaning 
of fairness and its link in Amar’s quotation to innocence, in particular, and, 
more generally, accuracy of results.24  Obviously, a tension exists between 
guarantees of procedural fairness provided to all those charged with a crime and 
a focus on accuracy and the subset of accuracy that gets the most modern 
attention—innocence.25 
The reality in the American criminal justice system is the inadequacy of 
the provision of counsel in far too many cases and the paucity of criminal 
trials.26  The prevalence of under-resourcing and massive caseloads for defense 
counsel means that many are, in any practical sense of the word, ineffective 
regardless of how well-intentioned and vigorous they are.27  Neither the 
inadequate provision of resources to the defense nor the relative infrequency of 
trials is likely to change for the better any time soon.  These are persistent 
trends, and if anything, they are likely to get worse as the need for long-run 
deficit reduction systemically restricts the resources available to state and local 
governments for the myriad of important tasks where pressing needs exist.28  In 
this context, it is difficult to imagine how indigent defense receives more than 
minimal funding because it competes against far more politically popular 
programs that are indeed major societal needs, such as education, roads, and 
healthcare.29 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See Robert P. Mosteller, Evidence History and Rumblings in the Future of Proof, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 523, 532-37 (2006) (describing new and expanding types of “trace” evidence such as automated 
recording cameras and tracking devices that provide the potential to prove locations of individuals with high 
degrees of certainty much earlier than trace evidence, such as fingerprints, did in earlier eras and can in larger 
percentages of cases than in the past prove guilt or innocence). 
 22. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978). 
 23. See id. (noting that, in some cases, an acquittal is not an accurate determination of innocence).  
 24. See supra note 5. 
 25. See Garrett, supra note 20, at 1669-70 (stating that the current failure of the states or federal courts 
to adopt a straightforward right to preserve and present evidence of innocence contrasts criminal procedure of 
an earlier era). 
 26. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 16. 
 27. See id. at 16-17. 
 28. Id. at 11. 
 29. See Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 121-22 [hereinafter Dripps, Up 
from Gideon].  Somewhat ironically, while disadvantaging defendants generally, including the innocent, who 
rely on underfunded indigent defense services limited funding, see infra Part II.B, limited state and 
particularly local funding may help those accused of the most serious crimes who are being prosecuted for 
their lives.  See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
227, 275-78 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty] (noting that in most states 
counties pay for capital prosecutions and have reasons to avoid costly death penalty prosecutions that may not 
reflect the local electorate’s priorities). 
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The Sixth Amendment also confronts a problem with the scope of the 
right to counsel pretrial, which is also analyzed in this Symposium.30  The 
demand that statements not be elicited from defendants represented by counsel 
has an exclusionary element that gives the guarantee its teeth.31  Indeed, the 
right to counsel at trial may be practically meaningless if guilt has effectively 
been established against the defendant through conversations with him by 
government agents before trial without the aid of counsel.32 
II.  FREQUENTLY IGNORED FEATURES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
LANDSCAPE THAT SHAPE OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT, REFORM, 
AND EFFICIENCY 
A.  The Cumulative Predominance of the State Criminal Justice Systems 
Despite Academic Preoccupation with Proceedings in the Federal System 
I find that most academic criminal procedure discussions focus principally 
on the federal criminal justice system and largely ignore the states.  Of course, 
the decisions of the federal courts with regard to constitutional rights are 
preeminent.33  The emphasis on federal constitutional cases is not the focus of 
my criticism.34  It is as if the American criminal justice system is the relatively 
well-resourced federal system, which is also characterized by an integrated and 
hierarchical prosecutorial structure.35  In fact, the vast majority of serious 
criminal prosecutions are handled in the much more chaotic and underfunded 
state courts.36  Although federal criminal law enforcement is expanding, 
criminal justice remains the predominant responsibility of states and localities, 
rather than the federal criminal system.37  As measured by those incarcerated, 
87.5% of inmates are confined in state prisons, and thus, 12.5%—or slightly 
more than 10%—are confined in the federal system.38 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See infra Part V.B. 
 31. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964). 
 32. But see Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009) (allowing impeachment using a statement 
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because “the accused continues to enjoy the 
assistance of counsel; the assistance is simply not worth much”). 
 33. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 34. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
739, 742 n.14 [hereinafter Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent]. 
 36. See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 1015 
(2009). 
 37. See Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2008—Statistical Tables, 
BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 tbl.2 (Mar. 2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf 
/pim08st.pdf.  From the end of 2000 through mid-year 2008, federal prison population grew faster than state 
prison population in general, moving from 10.5% of the total to 12.5%, and the federal system passing both 
those of Texas and California to house the largest prison population at the end of the period.  Id.  In terms of 
all inmates held in state or federal prisons of local jails, the increase was from 7.2% to 8.6%.  Id. at 16 tbl.15. 
 38. Id. at 3 tbl.2 (reporting that the total federal and state prison population was 1,601,584 and the 
federal prison population was 201,142).  When those housed in jails, which are typically the responsibility of 
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My perception is that most legal scholars who practiced criminal law 
before entering academia practiced in the federal system.  I spent my seven 
years in practice at the Washington, D.C. Public Defender Service (PDS).  PDS 
practiced principally, not in federal district court, but in superior court.39  This 
was essentially like many metropolitan courts in a state court system, a court 
filled with a mass of humanity and an enormous number of cases.40  But the 
prosecutors were Assistant United States Attorneys, and critically, PDS had 
nearly the resources of a federal defender office with, for example, its own 
budget line item for expert services.41 
Defense resources are the key.  In federal defender offices, heavy, but not 
unreasonable, caseloads and overall resources, in fact, permit conscientious 
counsel to practice effectively.42  For wealthy defendants who can hire their 
own counsel, for federal cases generally, and occasionally in other settings, the 
right to counsel is meaningful, but in far too many other situations, counsel are 
inadequately resourced and overburdened.43  Indeed, in many states, resources 
are woefully inadequate.44  This situation has existed for decades, and if 
anything, the situation is likely getting worse rather than better with the 
prospect of limited funds for state and local governments into the foreseeable 
future.45 
B.  The Limited Adequacy, Often the General Inadequacy, of Counsel for 
Indigent Defendants in State Criminal Justice Systems 
With over 80% of those charged with felonies being indigent, most 
defendants do not have the financial resources to retain their own lawyer.46  In 
addition, many of those determined not to be indigent under the varying 
standards used are of modest means and frequently receive marginal 
representation with, for example, little or no investigation to develop evidence 
to challenge the factual picture presented by the prosecution.47 
                                                                                                                 
localities rather than the states, are also included, the state and local percentage increases to 91.3%, and the 
federal percentage dips below the 10% level.  Id. at 3 tbl.2, 16 tbl.15 (reporting that the total held in federal or 
state prisons or local jails was 2,310,984 and those in federal custody was 201,142, the federal prison 
population being 198,402). 
 39. See generally PUB. DEFENDER SERVICE FOR D.C., http://www.pdsdc.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) 
(describing PDS). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Inga L. Parsons, “Making It a Federal Case”: A Model for Indigent Representation, 1997 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 837, 840 (describing her good fortune to work as a public defender “in the federal system where 
the culture of lawyering was based on traditional notions of adversarial advocacy and manageable caseloads”). 
 43. See Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 35, at 744-48. 
 44. Id. at 754. 
 45. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 11. 
 46. See Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 35, at 748. 
 47. See id. at 748, 781. 
2012] THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FAIRNESS 7 
 
We celebrate the Gideon decision, which grants the right to appointed 
counsel.48  As Professor Darryl Brown states, however, almost fifty years now 
after Gideon, the “political limit on defense counsel [underfunding] is a fixed 
component of criminal justice; underfunding of defense will not change except 
at the margins.”49  Underfunded lawyers faced with excessive caseloads of 
necessity engage in a severe triage process, with many having minimal contact 
with their client and little or no independent investigation before their clients 
become part of the great majority who are presented with the prosecution’s plea 
offer and, on advice of their counsel or from despair, accept it.50 
Many have noted these and similar problems as a backdrop to their 
discussion of the serious inadequacy of funding for state defenders.51  Over the 
last thirty years, the American Bar Association (ABA) has prepared a number 
of major reports on indigent funding, which reveal essentially the same 
fundamental funding inadequacies in the vast majority of states.52  In 1982, the 
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, after an analysis of 
funding in forty states, summarized the state of representation as follows: 
“Overall, there is abundant evidence in this report that defense services for the 
poor are inadequately funded.  As a result, millions of persons . . . who have a 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, state courts are required in criminal cases to provide counsel for indigent defendants). 
 49. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005) (making this assertion and linking it to the legislative 
decision to limit defense counsel’s effectiveness because of representation of guilty clients’ interests and lack 
of focus on accuracy in adjudication); see also Dripps, Up from Gideon, supra note 29, at 121-22.  Brown 
argues that although  
[r]ight-to-counsel (and later, effective-assistance) cases repeatedly described defense lawyers as 
improving the accuracy of adjudication,  defense counsel’s commitment is not to accuracy; it is to 
his or her clients, many of whom want inaccuracy to mask their guilt.  Legislatures recognize this 
difference, and they have responded to Court mandates for defense counsel by consistently 
underfunding defenders in order to constrain their effectiveness. 
Brown, supra, at 1590.  Whether Brown has accurately identified the causal mechanism, it is clear he has 
captured the reality of the result.  See id. 
 50. See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 
75 MO. L. REV. 683, 691 (2010) (describing the inadequate representation in many courtrooms where lawyers 
meet their incarcerated clients in the courtroom en masse and discuss for a brief time with them the terms of 
the plea offer and negotiated sentence, with wavier of rights and a guilty plea entered shortly thereafter in a 
“meet ‘em and plead ‘em” process). 
 51. See Randy Uphoff, Broke and Broken: Can We Fix Our State Indigent Defense System?, 75 MO. L. 
REV. 667, 667-68 (2010) (cataloging, in the foreword to a symposium on the failures of state indigent defense 
system, a large number of national reports, individual state studies, and articles on the frequent failure of state 
indigent defense systems to provide adequate representation); see also, e.g., Backus, supra note 12, at 952-61 
(characterizing state indigent defense systems as continually underfunded); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, 
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (noting  that 
“in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically 
underfinanced”); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to 
the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 800-08 (describing individual 
injustices resulting from inadequate representation); Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 35, at 748-
79 (same). 
 52. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
8 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1 
 
constitutional right to counsel are denied effective legal representation.”53  In 
2004, the ABA report found that “[t]oo often when attorneys are provided, 
crushing workloads make it impossible for them to devote sufficient time to 
their cases, leading to widespread breaches of professional obligations.”54  In 
2011, Professor Norman Lefstein, who has been at the center of the ABA’s 
study process, authored a book that cited two additional national studies 
completed in 2009, which delivered this same message: “[T]hose who furnish 
public defense services across the country have far too many cases, and this 
reality impacts the quality of their representation, often severely eroding the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel.”55 
The United States Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he very premise of 
our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides 
of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty [will] be 
convicted and the innocent go free.”56  The failure of states and localities to 
fund indigent defense adequately removes an essential ingredient of the 
adversary system—the existence of an effective opponent to the prosecution.57 
Indeed, it alters the basic character of American justice from its essential 
adversarial design. 
This failure to provide adequately paid and supported defense advocates 
is, in my judgment, the most serious challenge to justice in the United States.  
Most procedural protections granted in landmark Supreme Court opinions 
require the assistance of a lawyer for effective enforcement.58  “[Many] 
defenses can be independently recognized and accepted by prosecutors, but 
most cases proceed to the charging stage because of the apparent guilt of the 
defendant and the complexity of the defense or the ambiguity of the facts.”59  
This difficult environment requires skilled development of the evidence and the 
ability and resources to bring them before either the prosecutor or the jury in an 
                                                                                                                 
 53. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 2 (1982); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at 
35, 37 (noting in a shorter report prepared six years later a similar conclusion that “defense representation . . . 
is too often inadequate” because “we, as a society, [are] depriving the system of the funds necessary to ensure 
adequate defense services”). 
 54. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that “[t]o make matters worse, exceedingly 
modest compensation deters private attorneys from performing more than the bare minimum required for 
payment” and that “the structure of indigent defense systems often means that judges and/or state and county 
officials control the attorneys, thereby denying them the professional independence afforded to their 
prosecution counterparts and to their colleagues retained by paying clients”). 
 55. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL 
SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS:  ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 12 (2011). 
 56. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). 
 57. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 51, at 1036 (emphasizing the need for competent defense 
attorneys to protect the innocent from conviction).  
 58. Backus, supra note 12, at 946. 
 59. Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and 
Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design of Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 319, 328 (2011) [hereinafter Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System]. 
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understandable and persuasive form.60  Without adequate assistance of counsel 
and supporting services, much of what our system prizes in terms of rights, 
fairness, and accuracy simply has no chance to be achieved.61 
If I am correct, why is this effective denial of counsel not among the most 
prominent issues in criminal justice circles and in academic literature?  One 
reason may be that to protest the situation is the equivalent of “tilting at 
windmills.”  The situation will not change, and it is hard to see the significance 
of developing or pushing reforms if there is no effective chance they will be 
implemented.  I suspect that another reason underfunding has not received the 
degree of attention deserved is that the federal system, where academic 
attention is centered, generally provides much better funding.62  We should 
focus on the actual provision of counsel that exists within our operating 
criminal justice systems, not the assumption that provision of counsel in the 
federal “mansion house” is the norm. 
C.  The Limited Percentages of Criminal Cases that Go to Trial 
Gross data hide nuance and indeed can distort basic reality.63  The increase 
in percentage of cases ending in guilty pleas, however, is unmistakable.64  It 
ballooned over the last twenty-five years.65  In Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme 
Court gave us its summary: “Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (stating that effective assistance requires 
the defense to subject the state’s case to “reliable adversarial testing”). 
 61. See id. at 685.  I am among those who see the right to counsel as the most important right to ensure a 
fair trial and to protect the innocent.  See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case 
for an Ex Ante Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) [hereinafter Dripps, Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel] (“It is indeed the case that effective defense representation is the single most important 
of our system's safeguards against convicting people of crimes they had nothing to do with or of more serious 
offenses than they actually committed.  And it is indeed the case that there is no prospect of legislative action 
to improve the situation.”). 
 62. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 8 (listing the funding of indigent defense by 
state); see also Ron Gottlieb et al., Federal Assistance to State and Local Indigent Defense Programs FY 
1998 and 1999, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N (1998-1999), available at http://www.nlada.org/ 
DMS/ Documents/1013119600.02/Federal%20Assistance%20Report%20FY98-99.pdf (outlining indigent 
defense funding assistance available to the states). Even this relatively generous funding in comparison to 
other indigent support is for many lawyers below their ordinary market rate.  See Rachel E. Barkow, 
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
869, 881 & n.55 (2009) (citing effort to increase pay rates for appointed attorneys in the federal system 
because the existing rate does not even offset overhead costs).  I suspect that in combination the general 
adequacy of funding for both the defense and prosecutorial functions in the federal court system, the 
predominate experience of legal academics in that system, and the primacy of federal developments in 
published work produces a failure to recognize the important inadequacies of state court defense 
representation.  My sense is that most academics at national law schools interested in criminal justice issues 
are not aware of inadequacies in the indigent defense systems operating in their state criminal courts. 
 63. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 79, 88-89 (2005) [hereinafter Wright, Trial Distortion]. 
 64. Id. at 90. 
 65. See id. (detailing the increase of guilty pleas in federal trials and noting a similar result in state cases 
without providing the detailed progression). 
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ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas,” and as I 
noted earlier, announced that “ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials.’”66 
According to data presented by Professor Ron Wright, the number of 
federal cases rose from an average of 46,202 in the decade from 1980 to 1989 
to an average of 76,519 for the period 2000 to 2002.67  In 1981, the percentage 
of federal adjudicated cases that ended in a guilty plea was 77%, but by 2002, 
the percentage was 95.2%.68  The figures not only reveal a percentage drop in 
trials but also show a substantial absolute reduction in the number of trials.69  
Professor Wright estimated that if the trial rate was the same in 2002, the most 
recent year for which he had data, as in 1980, when the rate began its steady 
rise, the total number of federal trials and the costs associated with them would 
rise almost ten-fold.70 
Professor Wright suggested that distortions are just as important in state 
courts as in federal courts based on gross characteristics of the state court 
caseload and resources.71  Perhaps outweighing potentially larger penalties for 
trials in federal courts, jury trials typically get higher priority in lower volume 
courts dealing with more serious crimes, which is the relative nature of federal 
caseloads compared to those in state courts.72  Pleas in such state settings are 
often resolved based on limited conversation between attorneys because the 
“going rate” for a plea in each crime with a defendant having a certain criminal 
record is well-established.73 
Neither the percentage of cases going to trial in criminal cases nor their 
numbers are likely to increase in future years.74  The resource-scarcity problem 
caused by budget cutbacks at the state court level is creating a crisis of access to 
justice for civil litigants.75  Imagining that expanded resources are going to be 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 
(2012)). 
 67. Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note 63, at 89. 
 68. Id. at 91 fig.1.  Data from 2009 reveals the same basic high rate of pleas—95.3%—as in 2002. Mark 
Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics 2009—Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS 12 tbl.10 (Dec. 
2011), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09st.pdf (showing 81,894 guilty pleas and trials, with 
78,042 of them guilty pleas (95.3%) and 3,850 trials (4.7%)). 
 69. Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note 63, at 91. 
 70. Id.  Professor Wright argues that the increase in guilty plea rates was most likely the result of 
“prosecutorial . . . techniques that distorted trial outcomes” and particularly federal sentencing law that gave 
prosecutors and judges the ability to impose “ever larger and more certain penalty on defendants who go to 
trial.”  Id. at 116-17. 
 71. See id. at 154. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id.  Even at the felony level, the rough percentage of cases going to trial in the states is much the 
same as in the federal courts, with fewer than 6% of felony cases going to trial in 2004.  Matthew R. Durose 
& Patrick A. Langan, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (July 2007), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf. 
 74. See Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note 63, at 90 (noting the consistently high rate of guilty pleas in 
recent years). 
 75. Edwin Meese III & William T. Robinson, Our Liberty Depends on Funding Our Courts So They 
Can Protect All of Us, FOX NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/01/16/our-liberty-
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available to the criminal justice system to support trials with the unmet needs of 
the general public reaching crisis levels is unrealistic.  Professor Stephanos 
Bibas has argued that the reality is that, contrary to the view of most criminal 
procedure scholars, the trial is not “the center of the universe,” and rational 
suspects should not focus on maximizing their chance of success at trial.76  
Most sorting and effectively adjudicating is done by prosecutors rather than 
judges or juries.77  Indeed, protection of clear innocence may more likely occur 
pretrial than at any other stage.78 
III.  THE ATTRACTION OF PROCEDURES THAT ENHANCE THE PROTECTION 
OF THE INNOCENT 
A.  Innocence as an Enabler to Progressive Reform 
Much of the discussion of criminal procedure reforms today 
understandably takes place against a backdrop of concern for protecting the 
innocent.79  Exonerations, led by DNA exonerations, have greatly increased 
interest in reforms that promise protection for the innocent.80  As noted earlier, I 
spent seven years as a defense attorney PDS in Washington, D.C.  For a public 
defender who is obligated to defend whomever he or she is assigned to 
represent and whose role is generally conceptualized as caring about equal 
treatment under the law, giving special attention to an apparently innocent 
client is not easily accommodated;81 nevertheless, the prospect of innocence 
                                                                                                                 
depends-on-funding-our-courts-so-can-protect-all-us/; Sam Favate, Shrinking State Court Budgets: Not Just a 
New York Thing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/01/26shrinking-
state-court-budgets-not-just-a-new-york-thing/.  The reduction in civil trials, particularly civil jury trials, is just 
as dramatic.  See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
165, 172 (2006) (“[T]he civil jury has for all practical purposes disappeared. . . .”). 
 76. See Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421, 423-
24 (2003). 
 77. See Barkow, supra note 62, at 871 (arguing that in a system where only one in twenty cases goes to 
trial, prosecutors are not only law enforcers but also the de facto final adjudicators of nearly all cases); 
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L. 
J. 1, 45-46 (1997) (arguing that defendants, whether guilty or innocent have their best opportunity for a 
favorable outcome through the judgments of prosecutors who “sort” far more defendants than judges or 
juries). 
 78. See Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV. 139, 
151-53  (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection] (arguing that the trial 
has been displaced as the main event when it comes to innocence protection with more of the protection 
occurring pretrial and yet other instances of protection, particularly with the advent of some definitive 
scientific testing methods, such as DNA, to post-trial). 
 79. See id. at 147-48. 
 80. See id. at 143-44. 
 81. See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 509 n.100 (2000).  In describing 
the procedure guarantees in the Sixth Amendment to a trial and to a jury trial, Justice Scalia in Crawford v. 
Washington proceeded from an argument that the right could obviously not be eliminated simply because a 
judge believed it clear either that the defendant was guilty as to the right to a trial or that the hearsay was 
trustworthy as to the confrontation right.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004); quoted 
language in text accompanying infra note 191.  Obviously, if a judge cannot dispense with a trial because of 
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almost inevitably holds special power.82  Even more critically, concerns about 
innocence hold special attraction for critical groups for any successful reform 
effort—the public, legislatures, and judges.83  Innocence acts as an enabler for 
progressive positions that otherwise would attract little attention.84  
Unfortunately, the way innocence is often presented by those supporting 
exoneration or legal relief, and those who are skeptical, can distort the 
substance of otherwise sound proposals.85 
B.  A Narrow Focus on Proof of Certain Innocence 
Professor Rob Smith argues that innocence is likely most often addressed 
today pretrial and post-trial, omitting the trial as the focus of concern.86  I 
believe he is correct under his definition of innocence, which is definitive—or 
almost definitive—proof of innocence.87  Except in extremely unusual 
situations, prosecutors willingly dismiss cases when they are provided with 
clear evidence of innocence.88  Thus, I take little issue with Professor Smith’s 
point that definitive proof of innocence rarely occurs at trial.89  I do contest his 
contention that innocence is protected at trial in only a limited number of cases, 
a conclusion that I believe flows from the restrictive definition of innocence 
often used today.90  That is innocence definitively established or almost 
definitively established through irrefutable proof.91  The high bar for finding 
actual innocence is an understandable general perspective given the appropriate 
skepticism of self-serving innocence claims and particularly when, as Smith is 
doing, the focus is developing a post-conviction model for exoneration, which 
institutionally must require strong proof to overcome important interests in 
finality.92 
                                                                                                                 
her belief of the defendant’s guilt, defense counsel cannot cease to act as counsel guaranteed as another 
procedural right under the Constitution because she believes the client to be guilty. 
 82. For an effort to address this difficult balancing act, see Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys 
Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 54-56 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller, 
Defense Attorneys]. 
 83. See id. at 4-5. 
 84. See id. at 2. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, supra note 78, at 153. 
 87. See id. at 203-04. 
 88. See Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for 
Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 933-34 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller, 
Protecting the Innocent]. 
 89. See Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, supra note 78, at 153. 
 90. See id. at 143. 
 91. I am not here suggesting the broader concept that includes constitutional errors in addition to 
“actual” innocence within the term innocence.  See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1083, 1089-90 (2011).  I am instead highlighting that innocence can be actual but can remain unproveable. 
 92. See Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, supra note 78, at 141. 
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For many defendants, proving innocence is not possible because no 
definitive evidence of innocence exists.93  Rather, this class of innocent 
defendants are mixed among and hidden within a larger group that includes 
many guilty defendants as well.94  For the entire group, the evidence of guilt is 
relatively weak, and if an acquittal results, it is because the jury had a 
reasonable doubt.95  I believe that in overall numbers, when compared to 
definitive proof of innocence, quite a large number of the truly innocent who 
are charged with a crime are contained in this group of reasonable doubt 
acquittals.  Defendants in these cases can be identified as solid candidates for 
acquittal on the grounds of reasonable doubt, but they are typically not 
exonerated and rarely celebrated for having been proved actually innocent.96  
Definitively establishing innocence is particularly difficult when the defendant 
is innocent of the particular crime but not a stranger to crime.97 
Despite the decline in the number of trials, I believe the trial continues to 
be a key place where innocence is protected.  The limited number of acquittals 
surely far outstrips the number of defendants found clearly actually innocent 
post-trial.  Nevertheless, the place of the trial in our system is declining, and in 
much of the rest of this paper, I put emphasis on administrative remedies.98  
One reason is that while trial acquittals may hold a special place for innocence 
protection, an acquittal without exoneration will rarely be publicly celebrated.99 
To outside observers, unlike scientific proof of innocence, the result will appear 
to be just as likely a denial of justice in the acquittal of a guilty defendant as it 
would be the protection of an innocent defendant.100 
Nevertheless, the reality is that trials are available only for a small number 
of defendants.101  I draw two conclusions.  First, if one cares about the rights 
protected by the Sixth Amendment, reliance on protection of those rights at the 
trial proceeding will fail to reach most defendants.102  A focus on trial rights is 
appropriate and improvements there are important, but it should be part of a 
broader systemic approach that includes investigative and sorting processes that 
occur both before and after the criminal trial.103  Second, procedures that make 
an acquittal more likely are valuable and in fact are critical to protecting the 
innocent, but they will not necessarily draw public attention.104  This is one 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See Mosteller, Defense Attorneys, supra note 82, at 3-4. 
 94. See id. at 9-11. 
 95. See id. at 35-36. 
 96. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 88, at 977-80. 
 97. See Mosteller, Defense Attorneys, supra note 82, at 41-43. 
 98. See infra Part IV. 
 99. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 88, at 977-80. 
    100.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 101. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at 40-41 (discussing the underfunding of appointed 
counsel and its connection with frequency of plea bargaining). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the 
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1358-61 (1997). 
 104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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reason that support for more robust funding for criminal defense efforts will 
likely gain only modest support from the successes of the innocence movement. 
Improvement in overall procedures that, particularly before the trial, help sort 
the likely guilty from the likely innocent and provide greater fairness generally 
are, I suspect, the place where the most significant improvements can be made, 
and that is where I turn next. 
IV.  A GENERAL APPROACH: FAIRNESS, PRAGMATISM, AND 
EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGN 
As reflected in my title, my approach is to treat the Sixth Amendment 
rights of counsel and confrontation as part of the guarantee to a fair trial and try 
to develop reforms built around the principles of fairness, pragmatism, and 
effectiveness.  I do not propose any new definition or expansion of rights.  
Indeed, I question whether any “discovery” of a new core meaning to the right 
to counsel, for instance, more than two hundred years after the framing of the 
Constitution, could be powerful enough to produce the massive outlays of funds 
needed to fund indigent defenders throughout our dispersed criminal justice 
system.  We can, however, take important steps, principally through sets of 
changes at the administrative and operational level, to improve the base level of 
representation and the quality of justice.105 
Protocol for securing eyewitness identifications by the police provides a 
model for administrative reforms of the type I suggest.  Scholars have long 
criticized the weakness of the constitutional doctrines governing suggestive 
eyewitness identifications.106  That issue could be addressed by securing experts 
to testify about the weaknesses of the identification procedures in the individual 
case, which remains potentially available as an option.107  I suggest, however, 
the use of such experts will be of limited effectiveness because of the expense 
involved and the limited number of cases that go to trial.108  Instead, a remedy 
that is likely more effective for larger numbers of defendants is a change in the 
procedures used by the police to obtain identifications.  In my judgment, the 
simple mechanism of a “double-blind” procedure under which the investigative 
officer who conducts the identification does not know the identity of the 
suspect will be very important and effective in reducing suggestivity and will 
lead to fewer false identifications.109  Innocent individuals are spared the 
damage of initial false accusation, and the potential inadequacy of counsel to 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See Givelber, supra note 103, at 1358. 
 106. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A 
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1380-88 (2007) [hereinafter  Mosteller, 
The Duke Lacrosse Case] (describing generally the woeful inadequacy of the constitutional protections against 
suggestive identifications). 
    107.   See id. at 1410. 
 108. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012) (acknowledging that our criminal justice system 
is one of pleas, not trials). 
 109. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, supra note 106, at 1388-92. 
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investigate and try the case becomes irrelevant.110  A double-blind procedure is 
relatively simple to administer in many instances, not overly expensive, and 
quite easy to explain and defend.111 
Unfortunately, success with this type of reform lacks the payoff of a clear 
victory.  With a double-blind procedure in operation, we may be confident as a 
matter of logic that, overall, fewer innocent defendants have been charged and 
convicted and more justice has been achieved, but no clear victories can be 
documented.112  Again, my emphasis is on what works, not what derives from 
constitutional commands.  I suggest it may be helpful, however, to identify 
these administrative reforms as targeted to secure guarantees fundamental to 
our constitutional structure—labeling them as a suite of reforms designed to 
help fulfill the Sixth Amendment’s goal of effective assistance of counsel, for 
example.  In general, I have a preference for reforms that operate simply and 
are easy to explain and justify.113  Also, proposals will have more staying power 
if they resonate with elementary concepts associated with good government, 
one of which is transparency.114 
By contrast, creation of new rights or extension of rights that involve 
substantial monetary expenses will face significant hurdles and are likely to be 
modestly enforced.  For example, reforms that depend on providing additional 
experts to defendants may be difficult to implement, even if defined as rights, 
because of their cost.115  Also, reforms should be preferred that encourage and 
achieve compliance rather than principally punish violations through exclusion 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See id. at 1365-71. 
 111. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 617 
(noting that the double-blind procedure is relatively costless). 
 112. See Amy Klobuchar & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Protecting the Innocent/Convicting the Guilty: 
Hennepin County’s Pilot Project in Blind Sequential Eyewitness Identification, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 
26 (2005). 
 113. One of the problems I find with the new confrontation right as described by Crawford as covering 
only testimonial statements is that it is not easily explained to the skeptical.  Testimonial in what way and for 
what purpose?  See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359-74 (2004). 
 114. See David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELCOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 61-64 
(2011) (noting that transparency is necessary for good government). 
 115. See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 74 [hereinafter Sklansky, 
Hearsay’s Last Hurrah].  Professor Sklansky has argued for an approach to confrontation rights that is 
broader than the simple right to cross-examine, which is particularly important when experts are involved: 
  In the case of forensic science, meaningful confrontation likely requires a good deal more 
than disclosure of the results reached by the prosecution's analysts and their methodology.  At a 
minimum, defendants probably need access to independent experts, to the underlying databases on 
which the state relies, and—where feasible—to samples and materials that will allow them to carry 
out their own tests. . . .  It may also be that defendants cannot challenge forensic proof effectively 
on an individual, case-by-case basis; to make the Confrontation Clause more than an empty 
formalism in the increasing number of criminal cases that rely heavily on scientific proof, it may 
be necessary to put into place certain systemic protections—for example, regulatory oversight of 
forensic labs, and facilitation of information-pooling by defense attorneys. 
Id.  I find this a very interesting proposal and would only emphasize that parts requiring major outlays of 
resources, as in providing additional expert services for the defense, are likely to be unattainable in practice 
because of implementation costs, whereas less costly “good government” approaches of greater neutrality, 
access, and admissibility of evidence may be more viable albeit perhaps less effective. 
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of evidence.  I will provide three examples of systems that work the appropriate 
way. 
A.  Provision of Neutral Forensic Investigators and Analysis 
The early stages of a criminal investigation are handled by the police, who 
frequently are part of the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”116  
Largely that competitiveness will remain, but in many criminal cases a stage 
follows where critical pieces of evidence are examined and analyzed by 
forensic specialists, and here such competitiveness does not necessarily come 
with the task.117  Efficiency and accuracy may be enhanced by facilitating high 
quality, neutral investigation from the beginning by a law enforcement-related 
investigative and forensic sciences unit.  The experience in North Carolina 
recently with a blood analysis in the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) 
demonstrates the problems that can result when forensic science is not 
neutral.118  Evidence uncovered in an Innocence Commission proceeding and 
an unrelated criminal investigation revealed a systemic bias in the SBI that 
tested substances suspected to be blood at the crime scene and provided expert 
opinions on the significance of blood patterns at the crime scene.119  Evidence 
damaging to the prosecution was frequently withheld, and members of the unit 
saw their job as to aid the prosecution rather than to provide neutral analysis.120 
Some problematic SBI units have been disbanded, and an effort is being made 
to demand adherence to high standards of accuracy and neutrality for those 
functions performed.121 
In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court ruled that under the Due Process 
Clause, in a case dependent upon testimony regarding the sanity of the 
defendant, the defense had the right of access to an expert, but the Court did not 
conclude that access had to be to a defense expert.122  For effective adversarial 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 117. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-
DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1314-33 (2004) (discussing examinations of evidence by forensic 
analysts with no law enforcement involvement). 
 118. See Joseph Neff, Ex-SBI Agent Deaver’s Testimony Could Lead to Reviews, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Jan. 22, 2012, 10:06 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/01/01/1745785/peterson-case-just-the-
start.html. 
 119. See id. (describing pattern of erroneous results produced by one particular forensic specialist with 
the SBI blood analysis unit that led to the exoneration of one man in 2010, the new trial for another in 2011, 
and a formal outside review of and the termination of the blood stain pattern unit). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Long Delays in SBI Reforms Stir Its Critics, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Aug. 7, 2011, 4:38 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/08/07/1396114/long-delays-in-sbi-reforms-
stir.html. 
 122. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (“We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates 
to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at 
a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate 
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.  This is not to say, of 
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presentation, providing a defense expert has clear advantages, but a more 
neutral expert may be a realistic, second-best solution and perhaps the only one 
that is politically and financially feasible. 
B.  Full Open-File Discovery 
A very important reform for improving the defense, and arguably justice, 
is full open-file discovery.  That reform is linked, in my mind, to curing the 
weaknesses of the enforcement of the defendant’s right to receive exculpatory 
information from the prosecution under Brady.123  Prosecutors understandably 
have difficulty fully complying with Brady because, as part of their ethical 
duty, they have reached a conclusion that the defendant is guilty after review of 
all the evidence.124  As a result, they are likely to miss the “exculpatory” nature 
of evidence that they either did not notice or have already determined is not 
truly exculpatory.125  On the other hand, if prosecutors are obligated to provide 
all information available to them and to government investigators working on 
the case, the failure of the prosecutor neither to be familiar with the information 
nor to recognize its exculpatory impact matters.126 
Providing full open-file discovery should improve counsel’s performance 
in terms of both preparation for trial and effectiveness of cross-examination.  
Investigation is one of the components of effective assistance.127  Defense 
attorneys have less need to investigate and, if they do, an easier time conducting 
the investigation, if the prosecutor’s full file is available.128  Similarly, the 
resource imbalance between the prosecution and the defense is in part based on 
the support services available to each, with the prosecution benefitting from its 
ability to tap police investigative resources.129  Clearly, having a defense 
investigator whose task is to find information useful to the defense is different 
from, and preferable to, relying on the investigative resources of the 
prosecution, but providing the product of those prosecutorial resources to the 
defense effectively narrows the resource gap.  Similarly, full open-file 
                                                                                                                 
course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to 
receive funds to hire his own.”). 
 123. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1963).  The “Brady” right, as it is generally known, was 
first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland under the Due Process Clause.  Id. 
 124. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2011) (outlining the responsibilities of 
the prosecutor).  
 125. See Christopher Deal, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose and the 
Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1803 (2007). 
 126. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike 
Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 306-11 (2008) 
[hereinafter Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence]. 
 127. See United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I), 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (describing the 
components of effective assistance to include “appropriate investigations, both factual and legal”). 
    128.  See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1558-59 (2010). 
 129. See id. (noting that open-file discovery would even the playing field). 
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discovery will allow counsel to perform more effectively at trial, particularly in 
cross-examining and confronting government witnesses.130 
Obviously, there is a caveat to providing full open-file discovery.  That is, 
the potential imbalance it creates to advantage defendants, particularly 
defendants who are represented by excellent defense counsel with substantial 
funds.131  As a result, provision of full access to the prosecution’s investigative 
material requires some reciprocation by the defense in revealing its anticipated 
evidence.132  Together with greater neutrality of investigative services, these 
changes could result in greater injustice as more guilty defendants, particularly 
those with financial resources, are acquitted.  The focus here is upon achieving 
a larger measure of fairness and accuracy for the typical case where the 
defendant is indigent, and in those cases, there is less likelihood of a substantial 
imbalance favoring the defense.  Nevertheless, measures to achieve greater 
fairness will come with adjustments to defense advantages and the need to be 
realistic about potential damage to justice. 
C.  Neutrality by Design of Prosecutorial Investigative and Screening 
Functions 
Measures should be undertaken to structure the prosecutors’ offices to be 
more neutral at the investigative and charging phases.  Professor Rachel 
Barkow has argued that the modern-day prosecutor essentially functions as 
primary adjudicator for most defendants.133  This actual role should be 
recognized by separating the investigative function, which conceptually should 
be conducted more neutrally, from the trial function, which is inherently 
adversarial.134 
Similarly, agencies that perform investigative tasks generally should be 
organized and operated insofar as possible to approach the task neutrally.  
Justice is enhanced and efficiency gained by quality investigation conducted 
from the beginning by an agency operating as neutrally as possible rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 63 
(1993) (arguing that “[f]ull pretrial discovery is the key” to challenging through cross-examination expert 
testimony under the confrontation right); Andrew Taslitz, Catharsis, the Confrontation Clause, and Expert 
Testimony, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 103, 113 (1993) (same). 
    131.  See Medwed, supra note 128, at 1559. 
 132. See Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, supra note 126, at 273 (describing traditional arguments 
against full criminal discovery requirements centered in the fear of defense perjury to counter known 
evidence, witness intimidation, and the imbalance given the defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against 
required personal disclosures and the response of reformers to require rather broad reciprocal discovery from 
the defense). 
 133. See Barkow, supra note 62, at 876-77. 
 134. See id. at 901, 913-21 (arguing that U.S. Attorneys Offices should be organized so that separate 
lawyers handle investigation and charging functions); see also Mosteller, Failures of the American 
Adversarial System, supra note 59, at 339-43 (suggesting that a broadly considered organizational effort to 
make an effort at an initial neutral effort and an opportunity for later review by prosecutors who have a 
meaningful degree of separation from the direct prosecution of the case can facilitate a fair treatment of 
potential claims of innocence). 
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by requiring the later provision of a defense-oriented investigator or analyst to 
provide a competing perspective.135  Although cooperation between defense 
and prosecution is not part of the adversarial model or the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee, there may be places where the advantages to the client and the 
benefits to the effective administration coincide.136 
V.  SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO COUNSEL BEFORE AND AT TRIAL AND 
CONFRONTATION 
A.  Improving the Operation of the Right to Counsel at Trial   
1.  Unlikely Doctrinal Reformulation 
One way the operation of the right to counsel at trial could have been 
improved would have been through the definition of the effective assistance of 
counsel.  I express this thought in the past tense because this decided issue is 
unlikely to be revisited.  The approach of Judge David Bazelon in the initial 
panel decision in United States v. DeCoster would have provided an alternative 
construction of the right to effective assistance of counsel and effectively 
buttressed the enforcement of the right to counsel under Gideon.137 
Judge Bazelon’s opinion expressed the right to effective assistance in 
terms of “reasonably competent assistance,” which was in turn specifically 
defined through a series of duties, which he termed the “minimum requirements 
of competent performance.”138  That approach was first rejected by the D.C. 
Circuit, sitting en banc, which eliminated the mandate of specified duties in 
favor of finding ineffectiveness when the performance of counsel fell 
“measurably below accepted standards”139 and then laid to rest in the United 
States Supreme Court decisions in Strickland v. Washington and United States 
v. Cronic.140 
Judge Bazelon’s formulation of ineffective assistance of counsel differed 
from the Washington approach in two respects.  First, it defined duties of 
competent counsel in advance of the specific proceeding, whereas the Supreme 
Court adopted a more general objective standard of reasonableness judged in 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Cf. supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty, supra note 29, at 270-71.  Professor Smith 
suggests that in death penalty cases a well-developed defense presentation regarding the strength of the case 
for life imprisonment may allow the prosecution to reach a rational decision regarding a negotiated life 
sentence before committing to a costly and ultimately unsuccessful death penalty trial that, once announced, 
cannot politically be easily reversed.  See id. 
 137. See United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I), 487 F.2d 1197, 1199-1205 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 138. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster II), 624 F.2d 196, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., 
dissenting); see DeCoster I, 487 F.2d at 1203-04 (listing obligations such as conferring with the client and 
“appropriate investigations”). 
 139. DeCoster II, 624 F.2d at 215. 
 140. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 688-89 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 
663-64 (1984). 
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retrospect in the context of the specific case.141  Second, Judge Bazelon’s 
DeCoster approach did not incorporate a requirement of prejudice into the 
finding of the violation,142 while Washington requires the defendant to show 
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”143 
Had something like DeCoster I become the law, not only would 
ineffective assistance of counsel law be different today, but the Gideon right to 
counsel would have developed differently.144  Specific activities, such as basic 
investigation, would have been required as a standard matter to avoid the threat 
of reversal on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.145  But, ex ante 
performance standards are not currently legal requirements of effective 
assistance, and I see no path for such standards to become the law.146 
One potential route to something like this would be through an approach 
that gives primacy to a discerned core meaning of the right to counsel that 
includes a concept of adequacy.147  The originalism route, however, at least as 
defined by Justice Scalia, is blocked.  Scalia draws a distinction in United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez between the core meaning of the right to counsel and 
effective assistance.148  He describes the core meaning of the right to counsel to 
historically be the right of one who does not require the appointment of counsel 
to have counsel of his or her own choice.149  By contrast, he finds the right to 
effective assistance of counsel to be based on the Due Process Clause, rather 
than the Sixth Amendment, and derived from the purpose of ensuring a fair 
trial.150  That derived right comes with the limitations of its secondary status, 
such as the requirement to prove prejudice, which is not part of the core right of 
choice of retained counsel.151  Justice Scalia similarly concludes the broader 
Gideon right of an indigent to appointment of counsel is not part of the Sixth 
Amendment’s core right.152 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90. 
 142. See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1, 24-33 (2009) (discussing the general development of the effective assistance of counsel standards 
in the circuit courts prior to Washington and the specifics of Judge Bazelon’s DeCoster approach). 
 143. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 139-41. 
 147. See Chhablani, supra note 142, at 37-42 (making an argument for a Sixth Amendment based right to 
effective assistance of counsel disentangled from Due Process would be akin to that developed by Judge 
Bazelon in DeCoster I). 
 148. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 147 (2006). 
 149. See id. at 144, 148-49. 
 150. Id. at 147. 
 151. Id. at 147-48. 
 152. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1495 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Sixth 
Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, 
or to use volunteered services of counsel.”). See generally William P. Marshall, Progressive 
Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional 
Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1264-66 (2011) (describing how the conclusion that appointed counsel is 
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Whether the rulings in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye will have 
any substantial effect on the actual meaning of effective assistance is practically 
unlikely but possible, particularly at a theoretical level.  The cases make no 
direct theoretical changes in the general meaning of ineffectiveness, but the 
opinions suggest several changes in emphasis that may have an indirect impact 
on the meaning.153  First, in recognizing the importance of the guilty plea 
process, they may bring a focus on the actual practices in what is often a high 
volume, low effort part of criminal defense work.154  Supposedly, McMann v. 
Richardson has for over forty years required effective assistance when the right 
to a jury trial is given up and a guilty plea accepted, but it is hard to find in the 
results much attention to the adequacy of counsel’s efforts.155  More recently, 
the Court in Padilla v. Kentucky appeared to give some emphasis to the 
adequacy of at least one part of the advice before the entry of the guilty plea—
the immediate consequences of that plea in producing the defendant’s 
deportation.156  But, that opinion did not suggest the strong potential for a 
wholesale re-evaluation of the level of scrutiny given to counsel’s efforts before 
a guilty plea was entered.157 
Now, the Court reached two conclusions that it explicitly connected in a 
causal chain.158  It concluded, as noted earlier, that “ours ‘is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials.’”159  As a result, the adequacy of 
counsel’s effort in that plea process must be guaranteed, stating “it is 
insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that 
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”160 
The Court further explained that it is the negotiation of the plea that “is 
almost always the critical point for a defendant.”161  “In order . . . [for the 
defendant to get the benefits of a plea], criminal defendants require effective 
counsel during plea negotiations.  ‘Anything less . . . might deny a defendant 
effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice 
would help him.’”162 
A second point that the Court made in Lafler is potentially important to 
the future development of the scope of effective assistance of counsel.  The 
                                                                                                                 
essential to a fair trial, the central argument in Gideon, claims to flow directly from the constitutional 
definition but is not originalist). 
 153. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-11 (2012). 
 154. See id. at 1407 (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)). 
 155. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 
(1985) (ruling that Strickland v. Washington’s two-part test applies to ineffective assistance challenges to 
guilty pleas). 
 156. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 159. Id. (quoting Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1407-08 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Court rejected the argument that a just result is the only value protected by the 
right to counsel.163  The “fairness and regularity of the process that [precede]” 
the trial also matter.164  It quoted the language from Kimmelman v. Morrison 
that “[t]he constitutional rights of criminal defendants . . . are granted to the 
innocent and guilty alike.  Consequently, we decline to hold either that the 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or 
that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.”165 
These observations by the Court are obviously not new, but they do bring 
a sense of the defendant’s right to fair procedure into plea bargaining that more 
closely resembles the treatment Justice Scalia gives to core Sixth Amendment 
rights than does Strickland v. Washington.166  Scalia complains that the ruling 
in Lafler “embraces the sporting-chance theory of criminal law.”167  Whether 
this different perspective on plea bargaining will suggest to courts that some 
minimal level of investigation and discovery, for example, are always required 
before guilty pleas can be properly recommended by counsel is unclear but 
possible.  If some minimal level of performance were to be required for cases 
ending in guilty pleas or in rejected guilty pleas, it is difficult to understand 
why some basic level of performance would not be required for cases going to 
trial. 
2.  Improving Assistance of Counsel 
Real benefits can be gained through developing better administrative 
systems for provision of counsel.168  These changes can help by (1) giving a 
measure of independence to counsel;169 (2) putting the most able, available 
lawyers to work on the most difficult cases; and (3) taking advantage of 
institutional representations in particular types of cases.170  The requirements of 
a certain number of years of practice and expertise in the particular area of 
practice may not be elements of effective assistance as the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986)). 
 166. See supra note 152. 
 167. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 168. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 55, at 20-23 (listing, after inadequate funding, the structural problems of 
the appointment process and independence as among the major reasons for excessive caseloads for public 
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 169. See, e.g., Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty, supra note 29, at 265 (noting that in some 
counties where many death penalty cases are tried, the judges who control the appointment of counsel may 
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Supreme Court sees it, but those characteristics can be built into the criteria for 
appointment utilized by an independent administrative structure.171  Greater 
attention can also be paid—either by judges handling the trials or by new 
administrative agencies that appoint counsel—to ensure that the basic tasks of 
an adequate defense have been addressed.172 
A second suggestion goes toward realistic arguments to improve funding.  
As I recognized earlier, significant improvement in funding levels is unlikely.173 
While it is unclear that any approach can overcome the systemic and political 
barriers, an approach that is built around rough equity between prosecution and 
defense resources may have a marginally better chance of success.174  It also has 
some of the persuasive power of a good government argument to support it.175 
B.  Protecting the Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel Pretrial 
The limited reach of the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel pretrial against solicitation of incriminating statements from the 
defendant by government agents, first articulated under Massiah v. United 
States, demonstrates why a broader approach is needed to protect the interests 
behind the constitutional rights.176  Under the formalistic doctrine developed by 
the Supreme Court, these protections, for example, apply only to the specific 
charged offenses pending at the time of the government contact and apply only 
if the defendant establishes that the government agent deliberately elicited the 
statements.177  As a result, much government contact will not be covered, and 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665-66 (1984) (rejecting an approach that judges 
ineffective assistance on the basis of “extrinsic” claims about the qualifications or preparation of the attorney 
rather than actual adequacy of counsel’s performance at trial). 
 172. See Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Production Protocols, 45 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 133, 143-49 (2013). 
 173. See supra Part II.B. 
 174. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice 
Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 251-52 (2004) [hereinafter Wright, Parity of Resources].  I have also argued 
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 175. See Wright, Parity of Resources, supra note 174, at 262.  Professors Ron Wright and Don Dripps 
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test should be whether the defendant is represented by a lawyer roughly as good and roughly as well-prepared 
as counsel for the prosecution.” (emphasis added)). 
 176. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 177. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168-72 (2001) (ruling that right to counsel attaches only to 
charged offenses with no exception for uncharged crimes that are “factually related” to a charged offense);  
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 460 (1986) (ruling that interactions between defendant and informant 
placed in his cell did not constitute “deliberate elicitation” of the incriminating comments and therefore 
finding no Sixth Amendment violation). 
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the defendant may have a difficult time proving that the government agent 
actively elicited the challenged statements.178 
In general, legislative and administrative rules should be developed to 
expand recording, preservation, and disclosure of encounters between the 
police and citizens, particularly suspects and defendants, in situations likely to 
be involved in criminal justice proceedings.  This certainly includes all 
conversations between the police and defendants.179 
Requirements can be developed in investigative agencies to record broad 
ranges of evidence gathering, such as the taking of witness statements and 
contacts with suspects, and prosecutors can develop standards that require 
protective procedures, such as corroboration and review panels in cases where 
guilt is fairly viewed as uncertain and dependent on informant testimony.180 
While underfunding of defense services is apparently more acute, 
prosecutor offices are cash strapped and more and more are unable to 
investigate and evaluate cases extensively.181  This inadequacy may help some 
defendants whose cases will be abandoned, but it will likely not help justice or 
reveal inadequacies of proof against the innocent.  Moreover, as suggested 
earlier, prosecutors’ offices should be reorganized to facilitate neutral 
evaluation at the investigative and charging stages.182   
C.  Confrontation 
Like many of the other participants in the Symposium, I have interests in 
both Evidence and the Criminal Procedure camp.  I have a sense that the more a 
scholar is focused on Criminal Procedure, the more ambivalence he or she has 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington.183  When 
Crawford was decided, as someone who is fully invested in Evidence 
scholarship despite also writing in Criminal Procedure, I met the development 
with great optimism, but I had some trepidation as well.  The trepidation came 
for three reasons.  First, the right was defined as limited to formalized 
testimonial statements; second, it was anchored in the originalism of Justices 
Scalia and Thomas; and third, it is difficult to explain, particularly when it is 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 460. 
 179. Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
693, 715-16 (1996) (arguing that all police encounters in which consent may be requested should be recorded 
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 180. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents: 
Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 519, 519 (2009). 
 181. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at 5. 
 182. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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presented as exclusively a historically oriented procedural right on how 
evidence must be presented.184 
My reading of the state of hearsay and the developing concept of 
confrontation at the time of the framing of the Constitution persuades me that 
the testimonial concept gets the story roughly right as long as it is flexibly 
interpreted and not given a formalistic cast.  We are not at the end of the 
Crawford story, but rather in the middle, so a good conclusion is still possible. 
However, I have a feeling of disappointment and regret at the failure of 
Crawford to meet the expectations I held for a fundamentally new approach to 
confrontation.  I worry that Crawford has accomplished its single important 
victory—that of eliminating admission as a statement against interest of 
statements by co-participants in a crime to police officers interrogating them 
after their arrest—and that we have already seen the doctrine’s high water mark 
in Davis v. Washington,185 where it seemed that the new doctrine would cover 
most witness statements given to police officers after the commission of a 
crime.186 
Formalism and a restrictive definition of testimonial statements are leading 
the doctrine to be defined in ways that are not protective of a substantive right 
of confrontation based around a goal of testing major categories of hearsay that 
was accusatory against the defendant at the time it was made.187  My larger 
problems with originalism are outside the scope of this paper, and I note here 
only two.  Originalism cannot confidently answer most important modern-day 
issues at their cutting edge, which is where the Supreme Court decides cases, 
and it directs analysis, not to sound policy within the context of historically 
based principles, but instead to the rulings in what is usually a small set of 
analogous, and often ambiguous, English and American cases of the founding 
era.188 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at 68.  The argument for the necessary separation is that when confrontation is seen as derived 
from fairness, it becomes a hollow right that is eliminated whenever the evidence appears reliable and 
trustworthy and the defendant likely guilty.  See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 185. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  Davis involved two cases.  Id. at 817-20.  In one, the 
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of the “ongoing emergency” concept.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158-60. 
 187. See Mosteller,“Testimonial” Statement Concept, supra note 185, at 433-38. 
 188. The lack of concern with policy and consequences is not inadvertent by Justice Scalia but part of his 
basic view about the proper interpretation of the constitutional text.  See Arnold H. Loewy, A Tale of Two 
Justices (Scalia and Breyer), 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2011) (noting that “Justice Scalia . . . would 
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Justice Scalia explained why a judge’s assessment of trustworthiness or 
reliability was immediately irrelevant with a powerful analogy.189  He compared 
the procedurally based nature of two rights under the Framers’ design—the 
Sixth Amendment’s rights to confrontation and to a jury trial.190  He argued:  
“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin 
to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not 
what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”191  That analogy, however, does not 
explain why concerns related to untrustworthiness, such as the accusatory 
nature of the statements, are always irrelevant, and I believe the woodenness of 
the originalist approach to issues of policy contributes to the begrudging 
enforcement of the right by trial judges.192 
On the other hand, there is a core truth in Crawford’s relatively narrow 
testimonial approach—or something closely resembling it.193  If it were policy 
driven with pragmatic elements, which it is not supposed to be, it would rest on 
the proposition that a Confrontation Clause that covers too much hearsay will 
protect it only weakly or will be riddled with exceptions.  As a result, the 
Clause must cover only or strictly the most dangerous classes of hearsay. 
One of my major reasons that any definition of the Confrontation Clause 
right must be robust in its sanction for non-compliance is that frequently 
witness unavailability is subject to strategic decisions by the prosecution.  In 
Ohio v. Roberts, a witness, who was alive and well but not in contact with her 
family, was considered by the prosecution unfindable, which the Court 
accepted.194  But, as Justice Brennan argued in dissent, if the prosecution had 
not possessed a highly incriminating examination of that witness at the 
preliminary hearing, they would have been far more motivated to try to find the 
witness—efforts that may well have succeeded.195 
Obviously, some witnesses, such as those who are deceased, are clearly 
unavailable.  In many situations, however, such as with child abuse and 
domestic violence victims, the unavailability/availability decision is one that is 
subject to different outcomes based on the ease of fitting the case into an 
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exception and the sanction for failing to produce a potentially available 
witness.196 A confrontation right with real teeth at the enforcement end 
motivates the prosecution to produce witnesses rather than face the penalty of 
exclusion of their statements and results in a higher percentage of witnesses 
appearing at trial.197  The firm and harsh remedy, however, is not without its 
costs, and overall it gives the defense a benefit without a necessary connection 
to greater accuracy.198 
An advantage of providing confrontation where the witness is physically 
available is that providing the right is not usually very expensive because a trial 
is being held with counsel who can conduct physical confrontation and cross-
examination.199  A moderately skilled defense attorney can secure at least some 
marginally beneficial concessions through cross-examination in most cases.200  
Those benefits will be substantially enhanced if the reform advocated earlier of 
full open-file discovery is provided.201  With such discovery and its resulting 
access to information regarding the prosecution’s witnesses and evidence, the 
cross-examination made possible by the confrontation right will likely be much 
more complete and effective.202 
A distinction generally exists between certain classes of cases, which 
highlights one of the difficulties with the Crawford approach for domestic 
violence cases.203  When the challenged statement involves a child, children can 
generally be produced because they are in the care of an adult who supports the 
prosecution, and in many situations, the child, through careful preparation, can 
be made comfortable regarding testifying.204  Trauma that can make effective 
testimony unavailable is not to be treated lightly, but it is not necessarily 
harmful to the well-being of the child.205 
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In domestic violence cases, some victims can be produced.206  Others, 
however, become uncooperative, which can occur for a number of reasons—
most are unrelated to innocence.207  I find no easy or effective solution here.  
Proving forfeiture by wrongdoing will not be possible in many situations where 
it exists, and the costs of ensuring safety are considerable and of the type I have 
generally treated as prohibitive for effective reform.208  On the other hand, 
assuming forfeiture by wrongdoing for a whole class of cases would deny 
justice to defendants, some of whom are innocent.209  Domestic violence cases 
are the Achilles’ heel of Crawford.210  Victims frequently do not appear for 
trial, and although that may be because the initial accusation was false, the most 
frequent reason likely relates to a combination of intimidation by, and economic 
dependence on, the perpetrator.211  Moreover, while the prosecution could 
provide protection and assistance to victims and remedy much of these causes 
of unavailability, the required resource outlay would be enormous.212  Because 
such funds will not be forthcoming, the loss of evidence and justice in domestic 
violence cases under Crawford’s operation likely has no clear remedy. 
When the prosecution is unable to produce a witness and, as a result, will 
lose important evidence under the confrontation right, courts will be tempted to 
find ways to limit the costly right.213  That is the situation we often face in 
enforcing Crawford, particularly when prosecutors resist its commands.214  I 
hope that over time the focus will shift more to finding ways to ensure 
confrontation rather than the prosecution fighting its enforcement and scholars 
supportive of the right emphasizing the developing additional ways to provide 
confrontation rather than the remedy of exclusion. 
VI.  THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF FAIRNESS 
Fairness has many different meanings, and I highlight only one element of 
those differences.215  This element is the conflict between fairness designed to 
produce a just result and a guarantee of a fair procedure to all as a value 
separate from the impact on accuracy (or innocence).  Justice Scalia has a clear 
view of the Sixth Amendment that, interestingly, is immediately unrelated to 
either accuracy or innocence.216  The right to counsel is about the ability of 
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those with the financial capability to be represented by counsel of their 
choice.217  The right to confrontation requires a rather unbending commitment 
to confrontation for defendants against whom testimonial statements are 
offered.218  Justice Scalia acknowledges that in the judgment of the Framers 
these rights ultimately served interests of accuracy, but in their immediate 
application, he contends that they cannot be modified or constrained by such 
concerns.219  In his view, the rights do not serve goals of effectiveness or 
pragmatism either.220  They protect the clearly guilty just as much as the 
innocent.221  With respect to the right to counsel for indigents and ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he believes those are protections that owe much of their 
existence to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and as to these rights, concerns of accuracy and balancing of competing 
criminal justice goals do hold sway.222  As a result, he protests what he views as 
procedural fairness for its own sake in the Court’s most recent Lafler and Frye 
decisions.223 
My approach in this paper with regard to the Sixth Amendment has been 
to focus on measures that are effective and likely pragmatically obtainable that 
in turn serve interests of fairness—particularly accuracy and innocence.224  I 
have not cast my proposals as part of a remaking of the constitutional right but 
rather have concentrated on alternative procedures and administrative 
remedies.225  As a result, I have not suggested any modifications of doctrine that 
might undercut protections for rights based exclusively upon demands of 
procedural fairness, which may be those most likely to benefit clearly guilty 
defendants. 
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Nevertheless, as Professor Richard Myers has pointed out to me, the 
tendency of my suggestions is to separate accuracy protection, which subsumes 
innocence protection but also celebrates convictions of the guilty, from 
procedural protections that are part of our commitment to procedural fairness 
owed to each person—guilty or innocent—charged with a crime.  My proposals 
can particularly help those who can prove their innocence and those who are 
apparently innocent, and a few may still help the clearly guilty. The latter is 
illustrated by the benefit of full open-file discovery to the guilty in manicuring 
their defense to avoid inconsistent facts available to the prosecution, which are 
made known through discovery.226  One outcome of my suggestions may be to 
isolate and weaken the position of rights that are largely or exclusively to 
protect dignitary interests and defendants who have little plausible claim of 
innocence.  In an era of particularly limited resources for defending those 
charged with crimes and not of expansion of formally declared rights, some 
harm to those without a claim of lack of accuracy or innocence may be almost 
inevitable.  Hopefully, there will be larger benefits through more effective and 
achievable procedures that will outweigh the losses. 
In my judgment, the most fundamental right to the interests of defendants 
in the Sixth Amendment, and indeed in the Bill of Rights, is the right to counsel 
and, of course, effective counsel.  Resource limitations have made enjoyment of 
that right unattainable for a large number of criminal defendants. The recent 
decisions of Lafler and Frye regarding the right to counsel in guilty pleas may 
reshape part of the process, but I suspect that other than changing slightly the 
allocation of resources for defense counsel, after systemic adjustments are 
made, the opinions will have no impact on the allocation of state and local 
governments funds to indigent defense, which courts have had little long-term 
ability to affect.227 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
One function of a keynote is to link together themes of a conference or 
symposium.  In attempting to satisfy that goal, the task taught me a lesson, and I 
hope that this Article has conveyed that important point.  The lesson I learned 
in trying to link these parts of the Sixth Amendment is that they are linked in a 
concept of fairness.  Moreover, in trying to protect and extend the functions and 
interests that lie behind these rights, a systemic view is warranted and helpful. 
In a time in which it is painfully obvious that we have limited resources 
available to meet the goals of government and arguably a reticence to extend 
legal doctrines, those interested in progressive reform should look beyond 
commands based on developing new legal doctrine.  The interests of fairness 
can be furthered by administrative mechanisms and aided by actors in the 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 227. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392-95; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410-11. 
2012] THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FAIRNESS 31 
 
system beyond defense attorneys and their experts and agents.  The victories 
may not be the stirring ones of the Warren Court era or draw public note, but 
for the individuals not prosecuted or incarcerated erroneously, they can be 
extraordinarily significant and fulfill the basic promise of Sixth Amendment 
fairness.228 
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